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Abstract
In this article we argue that asymmetric information can explain
why seignorage is an inferior choice to debt for governments. We also
argue that the Ricardian equivalence for governments is very similar to
what the Modigliani-Miller proposition is for corporations. Our model
is based on Bolton and Huang (2018) in that money for governments is
similar to what equity is for corporations. In contrast to their model,
our model considers rational economic agents.
Keywords: government nance, pecking order, capital structure,
money, Ricardian Equivalence, Modigliani-Miller Proposition, asym-
metric information
JEL Classications: D25, D82, D86, E40, E51, E52, E63, G32
1 Introduction
Over the last 30 years, the theory of optimal nancing for the government has
become more and more inuenced by microeconomic theory. For example,
the sovereign debt theory uses the reputation model or incomplete contract
approach whereby the legal enforcement of debt is too costly, ine¢ cient or
even impossible at all, and therefore the debtor must be self-interested in
debt reimbursement.1 However, other microeconomic foundations developed
I started to work on this article during my PhD sudies at UQAM at 2004. I am
grateful to Steve Ambler for his helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper.
yBirmingham City University, anton.miglo@bcu.ac.uk.
1See Cole and Kehoe (1998), Cole, Dow and English (1995), Diamond (1989), and
Eaton and Gersovitz (1983) among others.
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within the nancial theory on the corporate level and in particular capital
structure theory seem to not be used often at the governmental level.2 We
mentioned the latter because recently Bolton et al (2018) called the prob-
lem of government nancing the capital structure of a nation. They also
mentioned the similarity between money for government and equity for cor-
porations and encouraged further research in this direction. In this paper we
continue this line of research. We argue that seigniorage is an inferior choice
to government debt and discuss the similarities and di¤erences between this
result and the pecking-order theory on a corporate level. We also discuss
future possible developments of this line of research and possible applica-
tions of other capital structure theories for government nance starting with
a comparsion between the Ricardian equivalence for governments and the
Modigliani-Miller proposition for corporations.
The three main sources of corporate nancing are: internal funds, equity
and debt. There are many similarities between these sources of nancing
and the three main sources of nancing for government expenditures: taxes,
seigniorage and debt. Both government debt and corporate debt represent
claims made by an investor (debtholder) to an issuer (borrower) consisting of
principal and interest. The inability to repay debt usually leads to the issuers
default or bankruptcy. Both corporate internal funds and taxes collected by
the government depend on the e¢ ciency of the rm in the rst case and
that of the government in the second case. Bolton et al (2018) mentioned
that there are many similarities between shares issued by corporations and
money printed by governments. For example both money and corporate
shares are residual claims whereas debt is not. Also note that the amount
of oustanding shares as well as money in circulation depends on the issuers
decision (corporation for shares and government for money). Finally, the
real value of shares depends on a rms success and the real value of money
depends on the e¢ ciency of the economy.
In this article we develop an asymmetric information-based theory of gov-
ernment nance. In contrast to Bolton et al (2018) our model considers ratio-
nal agents. We consider a country where the government considers a public
investment project and looks for funds to nance this project. The potential
sources of nancing are printing money and borrowing externally. Raising
taxes and using internal debt are not considered.3 When economic agents
2See Wedig, Hassan and Morrisey (1996) for similar ideas regarding the comparison of
private and state enterprises nancing.
3In corporate nance literature most articles related to capital structure make an usual
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and the government possess the same information about the quality of the
project and its potential benets and costs, the Ricardian equivalence result
emerges (analoguos to the Modigliani-Miller proposition on corporate level):
the government is indi¤erent between printing money and borrowing. Next
we consider a situation when the government has more information about the
economy than potential providers of funds. In these conditions the buyers of
government bonds or loan providers can be concerned about the quality of
available information and require a higher interest rate on bonds/loans. Sim-
ilarly, economic agents will react to seigniorage di¤erently than in a situation
when information is symmetric. They will have to think strategically about
the level of GDP (gross domestic product), ination etc. Our model pre-
dicts that issuing money is more sensitive to information asymmetry than
borrowing and so debt is preferred to seigniorage. This can be conrmed
in practice. For most countries seigniorage is only between 0 and 2% of
GDP and less than 10% of government expenditures (see, for example, Click
(1998), Haslaq (1998), Aisen and Jose Vega (2005)). While external debt is
usually between 10-30% of GDP.4 Also, our model predicts that the level of
GDP in countries that use seigniorage should be lower than in countries that
prefer debt. Or, alternatively, there is a negative correlation between the
level of seigniorage and the level of GDP. Elbahnasawy and Ellis (2015) nd,
for example, that seigniorage and GDP growth are negatively correlated. On
the corporate level, the signalling theory of capital structure predicts that
high-quality corporations should signal their quality by issuing debt which is
similar to the results in our paper.
Myers and Majluf (1984) set forth the pecking order theory. The key
element of the pecking order theory is asymmetric information between a
assumption that internal funds are not available. The capital structure problem then
becomes a debt-equity choice problem. The reason being that nancing with internal
funds is usually driven by di¤erent considerations than nancing with external funds. The
latter is a¤ected, for example, by asymmetric information between a rm and investors.
Similarly, for the government a debt-seignorage choice is not an unusal problem (see, for
example, Obstfeld (1997)). Often it is assumed that rasing taxes, and more generally tax
policy, is driven by very di¤erent considerations than seignorage or debt. One can assume,
for example, that raising taxes has large political disutility for the government (see, for
example, Schleifer and Vishny (1994)). Similar to Bolton et al (2018) we do not consider
taxes or internal debt (the latter is because in their paper internal debt is similar to money
creation). We further discuss this assumption in Section 5.
4See https://tradingeconomics.com/australia/indicators
and http://databank.worldbank.org/data/embed-int/Table-1-SDDS-new/id/4f2f0c86
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rms insiders and outsiders. Equity is dominated by internal funds in this
model. Low-quality rms use equity as much as internal funds but high-
quality rms prefer internal funds. Similarly debt dominates equity. Hence
a "pecking order" emerges: internal funds, debt, and equity (Myers and
Majluf, 1984). Analogusly to pecking order on a corporate level we argue that
issuing debt is preferred to printing money. Also since taxes are not subject
to asymmetric information they should be preferred to debt. Analogously,
on corporate level, internal funds do not depend on asymmetric information
problems so they are a preferred choice under asymmetric information.
Bolton et al (2018) analyzes funding of investments via foreign-currency
denominated debt or domestic currency claims. They show that a nations
optimal funding structure can be characterized as the solution to a trade-o¤
between ination costs and expected default costs. It also brings new insights
into such issues as the costs and benets of foreign exchange reserves and the
optimal currency composition of sovereign debt. In contrast to Bolton et al
(2018) in our paper the economic agents are rational. Also in our paper infor-
mation between the government and economic agents is asymmetric. They
mentioned the importance of asymmetric information but did not model it
explicitely.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
basic model and demonstrates the analogy between the Modigliani-Miller
proposition and the Ricardian equivalence. Section 3 analyses the model
extension with asymmetric infromation and demonstartes that seigniorage is
an inferior choice to debt. Section 4 describes the models implications and
analyzes how consistent they are with empirical evidence. Section 5 discusses
the models robustness and its possible extensions. Section 6 provides a
discussion about the similaritires between money for governments and equity
for corporations. Section 7 discusses possible applications of other capital
structure theories on a governmental level and Section 8 concludes.
2 Basic Model
2.1 Preliminaries: Corporate Debt and Equity.
Consider a rm that looks for nancing for an investment B, which produces
a cash-ow eR. Denote the initial number of shares outstanding by N . In
order to nance the project the rm may issue equity (let N be the number
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of shares issued) or debt (D).
Denition 1. A nancial contract is debt (with face value D0) if the
contract holders earnings are given by
WD = min
neR;D0o (1)
In this denition D0 = D(1+ r), where r is the interest rate. (1) means that
if the rms prot is su¢ ciently high (greater than the face value of debt)
the nominal debt is paid back in total; if not, the debtholders have the right
to all the prot.
Denition 2. Shares are securities with the following earnings:
WS =
fRn
N 0
(2)
where Rn means the rms net prot (after repayment of debt if necessary)
and N 0 = N +N means the total number of shares after the issue.
Note that:
min(R;D0) + max(0; R D0) = R (3)
(1) and (3) imply that (2) is equivalent to the following:
WS =
max
neR D0; 0o
N +N
(4)
This equation means that the shareholders are residual claimants, i. e. if
the rms prot is su¢ ciently high the shareholders will divide the net prot
according to the number of their shares; if not, they have nothing.
2.2 Government Finance vs. Corporate Capital Struc-
ture.
Suppose that a government considers a public project and denote the total
expenditures for this project as G in real units.5 The countrys GDP after
5For a non-US country real units can represent US dollars, for example. Or one can
assume that the project requires G units of some specic assets etc. The key here is a
separation between money and assets. To convert the nominal value of money to its real
value one should use the convertion ratio. If real units represent US dollars, one can use
US/home currency exchange rate. For more discussion about real and nominal values see,
for example, Wolla (2013).
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the project completion (t = 1) is eY (stochastic) (we suppose that there is 1
product in the economy and denote by p its price at t = 1). The expected
value of GDP is equal to , i.e.  = Y and let  2 [min; max].  becomes
known to the government at t = 0 but not to the investors or consumers. To
nance the project the government can borrow (the total debt in real units
will be referred to as D), or it can issue money. Let M be the nominal
quantity of money issued (we also assume that initially the quantity of money
in the economy is M0 and governments debt is 0) and let e denote the real
value of 1 unit of money in period 0. The government budget constraint is
then:
D +Me = G (5)
For simplicity we assume that the economic agencts are risk-neutral. Note
that M can be positive or negative as well. The former situation can be
interpreted as a seigniorage. In this case the government prints M units
of nominal money in order to purchase the total amount of real units equal
to eM (it can be for instance, an additional amount of labor). When M
is negative, debt is higher than investments and the surplus represents what
is available for the current consumption of real goods. In this case eM
represents the net consumption in the rst period. After Y is realized, the
government pays back the debt D0. The sequence of events is present in
Figure 1.
-t = 0 t = 1s s
Countrys type
is revealed to
the government
Government chooses
M and D
e is determined
Public investment project
is undertaken
The country GDP Y
becomes known
If Y > D0 the creditors are paid back
The moneyholders receive their utility
If Y < D0 the country is bankrupt
and the money is worthless
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Figure 1. The sequence of events.
If eY > D0 the debt is repaid in total. If eY < D0, debtholders receive Y .
Hence the debtholders payo¤ is equal to
gWD = minneY ;D0o (6)
which is equivalent to (1). The real consumption in period 1 is
fC1 = maxneY  D0; 0o (7)
To purchase period 1 consumption the consumers use their nominal money
stock (M0 +M). The cash-in-advance constraint is6:
M0 +M  pC1 (8)
where p is the price level. Since money is worthless after period 1 the con-
straint (8) is binded in equilibrium. Since the consumers are risk-neutral,
the real value (in real consumptions units) of one unit of money in period 1
(WM) is equal to 1p and equ. (7) and (8) imply that this equals
WM =
1
p
=
C1
M0 +M
Or:
gWM = max
neY  D0; 0o
M0 +M
(9)
which is equivalent to (4).
Money to governments is similar to what equity is to corporations, and the
seigniorage-sovereign debt choice can be analyzed as the equity-debt choice
on a corporate level. We can also see why in this economy people keep money.
This is because in the case when real GDP (in real units) is high then prices
are low and money holders can fully benet from this deation as compared
to the debtholdersearnings, which are limited in real units by D0.
6Recall that M can be negative (technically it can not be less than  M0). This
is analogous to a stock repuchase on a corporate level. This happens in cases when
external debt is too high and there is a current surplus in real units. Consumers decrease
their period 1 consumptions (eqals to Mp in absolute value) and increase their period 0
consumptions (C0 =  eM).
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2.3 Symmetric Information.
In this section we analyze a perfect market case, i.e. we assume that eco-
nomic agents have the same information as the government about the project.
Suppose that the governments objective is maximizing the expected real net
consumption:
Cn = C0 + C1 = C1   eM (10)
where C1 is expected period 1 consumption and eM is the cost of seignior-
age.7 In this case nancing policy does not matter and the Ricardian equiv-
alence holds. It means that, no matter the policy, the expected real net
consumption equals
Cn = Y  G (11)
To see this, consider the following scenarios:
1. Debt nancing. (M = 0). The equilibrium creditorspayo¤ should
cover the cost of their investments. It implies
G = WD = E
h
min(eY ;D0)i ; (12)
C1 = E
h
max(0; eY  D0)i (13)
(12) represents the risk-neutral equilibrium valuation formula (see (6)). The
expected earnings of debtholders (WD) must be equal to G (initial cost). (13)
is just an application of (7). Given the identity (3) they imply (11).
2. Seigniorage. (D = 0). The equilibrium relations are now
G = Me (14)
e = WM =
Y
M +M
(15)
(14) represents the governments budget constraint. (15) means that the real
money value in period 0 must be equal to the expected real money value in
7Recall that if M is negative  eM represents the net current period consumption.
Note that traditional macroeconomic literature (like Barro and Gordon (1983a,b), Backus
and Dri¢ ll (1985) or Bernheim and Bagwell (1988)), often assumes the ad-hoc objective
functions, or assumes the exogenously known law of changing GDP as a function of future
ination, or a multi-period setting with overlapping generations. An advantage of our
model and in general an advanatge of using a microeconomic approach to government
nance is that it does not have many of the ad-hoc assumptions described above.
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the period 1 (seigniorage equilibrium condition). These equations also imply
(11).
Proposition 1. The value of money does not depend on the governments
nancial policy. Regardless of the policy chosen by the government, the real
value of money ( e) equals
e =
Y  G
M0
(16)
Proof. For the case of seigniorage it follows from (14) and (15). For the
case of debt nancing it follows from (11), (13) and (9) given that Cn = C1
in this case.
This is merely the Modigliani-Miller theorem (meaning that in a perfect
market, share price is irrelevant to nancial policy) applied to the government
(see Wallace (1981) and Barro (1974) for examples of alternative views of
government policy irrelevance).
3 Financing Under Asymmetric Information.
If the information shared by the government and investors is symmetric then
seigniorage and debt lead to the same result. What if information is asym-
metric?
Consider the following situation. Suppose that  is known by the gov-
ernment but not by the investors and the consumers. We use the money-in-
utility approach8 and the governments objective function is U = Cn + ae;
where a is a known parameter, a > 0. U depends on total net consumption
Cn and the value of money at t = 0, which reects the expected level of
ination (recall that e depends on both the level of GDP and quantity of
money in the economy (see (15)). Suppose for simplicity that Y  G in any
state of nature, meaning that the project can be nanced by risk-free debt.9
Proposition 2. If information between the government and economic
agencts is asymmetric, debt dominates seigniorage, i.e. no country uses
seigniorage except the one with the lowest GDP.
Proof. If the project is nanced by this risk-free debt, (11) and (16) imply
8See, among others, Blanchard and Fischer (1989). This approach is typical in modern
macroeconomics.
9On a corporate level, the result holds even if debt is risky (Noe and Nachman (1994)).
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that the value of the governments objective function equals
  G+ ae =   G+ a  G
M0
(17)
The last term equals a  G
M0
becasue if nancing is debt, the amount of money
in the economy equalsM0. If the country of type  uses seigniorage it equals
Ve =   G+ ae (18)
Comparing (17) and (18) we get that the government issues money if and
only if e   G
M0
. In equilibrium (risk-neutral valuation) it must be that
e = E[
1
p
],
e = E[

M +M0
]
Since in the case of seigniorage eM = G we can rewrite this as
e =
E[] G
M0
(19)
where the expectation is taken under the condition that type  issues money.
It will be the case if
e    G
M0
(20)
The only solution to equations (19) and (20) is e = min G
M0
.
In equilibrium no government would nance its project with seigniorage
(except for the generic case of the country on the lower bound min) because
the real value of money at time 0 is min G
M0
.
4 The Model Implications.
1. Debt dominates seigniorage. Our model predicts that in an environment
with asymmetric information about GDP, debt dominates seigniorage. This
result is consistent with empirical evidence. As was mentioned previously,
for most countries seigniorage is only between 0 and 2% of GDP and less
than 10% of government expenditures while external debt is usually between
10-30% of GDP.
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2. Seigniorage reduces the real value of money. As follows from the model,
if a country increases M , e goes down. After the market learns that the gov-
ernment has a valuable investment project (but before the nancing decision
is made), the true value of money is  G
M0
. However after the seigniorage is
announced, the value of money is min G
M0
. In all cases e decreases except for
the case for a country with lowest GDP possible. This result is also consistent
with empirical evidence. For example Haslaq (1998) states that a large body
of empirical evidence suggests that the rate of money creation is closely cor-
related with ination. Hence, faster money creation costs society by eroding
the purchasing power of money already in circulation, which is the ination
tax. Good illustrations are well known historical examples of hyperination
related to large volumes of printed money: european countries at the end of
WWI and in 1920s, Argentina in 1980s, etc.
3. Pecking order of government nance. Countries with high expected
GDP values should use taxes as much as possible for nancing and avoid
external nancing because tax collection is not subject to asymmetric in-
formation problems unlike borrowing or printing money. This seems to be
consitent with the observation that taxes usually cover about 70-90% of gov-
ernment spending10 (similarly on the corporate level internal funds cover
about 60-70% of investments11), followed by debt and seigniorage.
4. Countries with higher extents of asymmetric information about GDP
should use less seigniorage. One can measure the extent of asymmetry by
the level of transparency of government activities (see Fry et al (2000) and
Geraats (2005)).
On the corporate level the classical theory is the pecking-order theory,
which implies that rst of all corporations use internal funds to nance ex-
penditures, then debt and nally equity (Myers and Majlu¤ (1984)). In
contrast to corporate literature, the governments objective function is dif-
ferent from the objective function of a typical corporation. This creates a
major di¤erence between our model and, for example, Myers and Majlu¤
(1984). Other implications of the pecking-order theory for corporations12
include the following. 1) The announcement of issuing stock drives down the
stock price (Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Antweiler and Frank, 2006). This
is analogous to our result that seigniorage reduces the real value of money.
10See, for example, Booth (2016).
11See, for example, Brealey and Myers (2016).
12See, for example, Miglo (2011).
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2) A Negative correlation between debt and protability (see Titman and
Wessles, 1988). Good-quality rms tend to use internal funds for nancing
as much as possible. Because low-quality rms do not generate as much
prots and retained earnings as high-quality rms, they use external sources,
usually debt, more frequently. Although our model does not include taxes,
the implication of a similar point for the government is quite inutitive. Since
the collection of taxes depends only on actual (past) performance of rms
in the economy and it is not subject to asymmetric information regarding
the quality of future projects, countries with a high level of GDP should pri-
marily use taxes to nance their projects and not external nancing (debt)
to avoid adverse selection problems. Countries with a low level of GDP do
not have enough revenues from taxes so they will use debt. Empirically,
some research nds a negative correlation between external debt and the
rate of GDP growth (see, for example, Shkolnyk and Koilo (2018)). How-
ever most reserach nds a non-linear relationship between external debt and
GDP growth. Note that some recent versions of asymmetric information-
based theories of capital structure also provides di¤erent suggestions for the
relationship between debt and proftability (see, for example, Ebaid (2009)
and Finnerty (2013)). 3) The Pecking order theory predicts that a higher
extent of asymmetric information reduces the incentive to issue equity. This
is analogous to our predictions that higher extent of asymmetric information
reduces the incentives for seignorage. Note that on a corporate level the
empirical evidence is ambiguous. DMello and Ferris (2000) and Bharath,
Pasquariello, and Wu (2008) support the prediction that the pecking order
theory is more likely to hold when the extent of asymmetric information is
large. Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) nd that equity issues are more
frequent when the economy is doing well and information asymmetry is low.
Yet, Frank and Goyal (2003) nd the greatest support for the pecking order
theory among large rms that are expected to face the least severe adverse
selection problems because they receive better coverage by equity analysts.
5 Model Extensions and Robustness.
Indexed debt. Our models results hold if instead of external debt we analyzed
the indexed debt (see, for example, Sargent (1989) regarding the theory of
indexed debt). The indexation is assumued to follow the ination rate which
in turn follows the real value of money. In this case the indexed debt is
12
similar to external debt.
Internal debt. This logic does not work when internal debt is also possi-
ble. External debt di¤ers from internal debt in that the latter is paid (and
paid back) in nominal units (in nominal currency). We follow Bolton et al
(2018), which does not consider internal debt. In their model internal debt
is analogous to printing money. In some of our models variations (when
slightly changing the government objective function, for example) one can
show (available upon demand) that internal debt is equivalent to issuing
warrants on a corporate level. Warrants are typically not a part of the tra-
ditional debt-equity choice models since it involves other consideration like
the control rights of shareholders (see Kalay and Zender (1997)) which may
be a¤ected when corporations issue warrants instead of traditional equity.
This aspect of capital structure choice is considered less important compared
to other issues and so warrants are rarely included as part of major discus-
sions related to the pecking order theory or other capital structure theories
for corporations. Including warrants in traditional debt-equity choice mod-
els sometimes produces interesting results, such as Green (1984), but the
main results of POT about the dominance of debt over equity is gerenally
una¤ected. By analogy, including internal debt will not have signicant im-
plications regarding the main results of our model. In this paper we suppose
that only external or indexed debt is possible. The interpretation is that
internal debt is theoretically limited by the amount nominal money while
sovereign debt and money issues are not limited.
Two periods. An interesting extension is a two-period model. For exam-
ple, one can assume that in each period the government has an investment
project. If one country has a higher expected GDP in each period than an-
other country then the result of the basic model holds (proofs are available
upon demand): debt dominates seigniorage. However, if one considers di¤er-
ent scenarios, for example, when one country (can be called growing country
or developing country) has a lower GDP in period 1 and a higher GDP in
period 2 than another country (can be called stagnating country), one can
show that a separating equilibrium can exist where the developing country
type will tend to issue debt while the stagnating one will issue money. This
can produce so far nontested hypotheses about the link about government -
nancing policy and the countrys GDP prole over time (for a similar analysis
on corporate level see Miglo (2007) and Miglo (2012)).
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6 Money for Government As Equity For Cor-
porations: a Discussion.
In the introduction we began a discussion about the similarites between the
sources of nance for the government and the corporation. Below we consider
some di¤erences between money and corporate shares. We argue that while
formal di¤erences between themdo exist, they are less obvious if considered
on a more abstract level.
1. Money does not provide any dividends while shares do.
Only 20% (Fama and French (2001)) of corporations pay dividends, al-
though these dividends are not the most important part of equity revenue
(capital gain is the most important part). The real value of money is equiva-
lent to the shares price and the change in the real value of money is equivalent
to capital gain. The government can distribute some "dividends" to people
living in a country (moneyholders). As an example note lotteries or pension
funds. On the corporate level, the amount of dividends is proportional to the
number of shares. There exist some exceptions however. First, the company
may issue di¤erent types of shares which will grant larger dividends to some
shareholders. Secondly, informal di¤erences exist when major shareholders
or those who have control enjoy extra benets, perks etc. at the expenses
of minor shareholders (see, for example, Grossman and Hart, 1980; Burkart,
Gromb and Panunzi, 1997, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The govern-
ment "dividends" also depend to some extent on the amount of money. For
example, one needs to buy tickets in order to particiapte in a lottery. The
amount of government funded pension funds depends on the amount earned
by individuals.
2. Money provides no votes.
Firstly, note the free-rider problem (see, for example, Grossman and Hart,
1980) - whereby the right to vote does not play a large role in the life of
an enterprise. Secondly, money often provides power.13 Even though each
individual has one vote, in reality money plays a large role during the electoral
process or other issues related to government decision-making and control.
Other things being equal, those who are able to accumulate larger amounts
of money or nd support from those with large amounts of money have an
13See, for example, Coleman (1986) for a detailed analysis of this idea. Note that
personal wealth is probably a more precise parameter of power than money and the same
could be true on a corporate level.
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advantage.
3. Corporations maximize prots while governments do not.
Modern corporations are di¤erent than the smaller corporations that ex-
isted in the 19th century, when the decision making process was carried out
by one person: generally the actual owner and manager. Now there are the
managers who, while often partial owners, are separate from shareholders and
act as the shareholdersagents. The same is true at the level of the govern-
ment (managers), who maximize the wealth of the total population, who are
in fact the moneyholders (shareholders). In the end the e¢ ciency of govern-
ment a¤ects the economy e¢ ciency, which in turn a¤ects the governments
ability to pay its debts as well as the real value of money and the amount of
taxes. Note that the government can reduce tax rates (which will ultimately
reduce the amount of collected taxes) during an improving economy. In the
corporate case high e¢ ciency ultimately leads to a larger amount of internal
funds. The point however is that the governments major concern is not the
amount of taxes it receives but rather the GDP or similar measures of the
e¢ ciency of the economy, whose increase should lead to higher taxes if tax
rates remain unchanged. To see an analogy of a tax reduction on the corpo-
rate level imagine a multinational corporation that esablishes a policy with
its branches abroad regarding the percent of prot that a branch has to send
to the head o¢ ce. If one day they decide to reduce this percent the amount
of cash available to the head o¢ ce can decrease even if the corporation has
been working more e¢ ciently.
4. In cases of insolvency, it is possible for a government to print money
while this is impossible for corporations.
First, in cases of insolvency, we know that corporations can and often
do cover their debts by issuing new equity. Second this thesis means that
it is impossible for a government to declare bankruptcy. But this is not
true (Germany in the 1920s, Russia in 1917, 1998, Argentine etc.) Often the
reason for this is that should a government prints money to cover bankruptcy,
then the resulting costs of ination become too high.
The goal of the next section is to provide further intuitions about possible
applications of the traditional capital structure theory (debt-equity choice)
on government nancial policy.
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7 Major Theories of Capital Structure and
Their Possible Applications for Government
Finance
1. Trade-o¤ theory. In contrast to dividends, interest paid on debt reduces
the rms taxable income. Debt also increases the probability of bankruptcy.
Trade-o¤ theory suggests that capital structure reects a trade-o¤ between
the tax benets of debt and the expected costs of bankruptcy (Kraus and
Litzenberger, 1973). There are two types of bankruptcy costs: direct costs
(lawyer fees, the cost of bulk asset sales, court fees, etc.) and indirect costs
(costs associated with: losing customers who might have been already worried
about the company prior to the bankruptcy; higher interest rates required by
bankers; reputation loss etc.). Can the concept of expected bankruptcy costs
be applied to government nance? Expected bankruptcy costs depend on the
probability of bankruptcy and the magnitude of bankruptcy costs. Similalry
tothe corporation, the probability of government default increases with the
amount of debt. With regard to the magnitude of bankruptcy costs note
that that on a corporate level they depend on such factors as the tangibility
of a rms assets, the industry in which a rm is operating (Branch, 2002)
etc. What about governments? Since most external loans are not easily
enforceable, direct costs of bankruptcy may represent cost associated with
the actual settlement of bankruptcy procedures which, unlike the cases on
the corporate level, may include political conicts and perhaps even wars.
Goldmann (2012) argues, for example, that excessive sovereign debt leads to
a higher risk of unrest and civil war. An example of politically motivated
costs are Russian bonds issued before the Revolution of 1917, which could
not be paid because the socialist government refused to pay for the debts of
tzarist Russia until 1995 (Oosterlinck, 2006). The concept of bankruptcy cost
leads to the following possible implications for the government. Countries
with tangible assets (government invested in industries with tangible assets)
should borrow more. In general safer countries, countries with more political
stability etc should borrow more. This is consistent with, for example, Aisen
and Vega (1998). Also countries with high military power like, for example,
Russia (who have presumably high direct bankruptcy costs from the lenders
point of view) should borrow less.
We disagree with Bolton et al (2017) that the trade-o¤ theory of capital
structure cannot be applied on a governmental level. Although there is no
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direct implication of the tax idea for the government since governments do not
pay taxes and government debt does not have any tax advantages. Indirectly,
it may be related to the marginal costs and benets of taxes in other forms.
The decrease in the purchasing power of money after a money issue can
be seen as an ination tax (see, among others, Kiguel and Nuemyer (1989),
Poterba and Rotemberg (1990)). In this case the optimal government budget
policy would be determined by a trade-o¤ between the ination tax and the
bankruptcy costs discussed above. This is analogous to the trade-o¤ theory
of capital structure at the corporate level. Alternatively, one can assume
that the marginal costs of rasing taxes is lower in countries with high debt
and thus these countries should use debt less.
2. Signalling. In the pecking order model, good quality rms have to use
internal funds to avoid adverse selection problems and losing value. These
rms cannot signal their quality by changing their capital structure. Sig-
nalling theory discusses models in which capital structure serves as a signal
of private information (Leland and Pyle (1977), Ross, 1977). Usually, the
prediction of these models is that the market reaction on equity issues (or
leverage-decreasing transactions) is negative and the market reaction on debt
issues (more generally, on leverage-increasing transactions such as issuing
convertible debt, repurchasing shares, and debt for equity swaps) is positive
although the former has mixed evidence. An anlogy on a governmental level
is that the seignorage is a negative singal of a countrys quality. Further
reserach is required.
3. Security Design, Informed Investors, and Information Production. In-
vestors such as banks can sometimes obtain information on a rms quality
and produce analytical information. Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) show that
good rms want to partition their securities so that some claims are infor-
mationally sensitive. If the cost of becoming informed is low and the degree
of asymmetric information is high, rms may prefer a higher information
sensitive security to promote information production by specialized out-
side investors. This explains the negative correlation between debt and rm
value because rms with low protability do not need to issue equity, which is
sensitive to a rms value. Usually this theory predicts that younger rms or
rms with good growth opportunities or more risky projects are more likely
to be equity nanced. These rms can be especially interested in information
production by outside investors. On a governmental level, this idea may be
related to extracting information from banks or foreign investors in terms of
their private knowldge of a countrys prospectives. So developing countries
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or countries with growing GDP should print more money.
4. Market timing. The decision to issue equity depends on stock market
performance (Lucas and McDonald, 1990; Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald,
1992). This idea did not become a major capital structure theory, called
market timing, until Baker and Wurgler (2002). Usually this theory pre-
dicts that when the economy is bad or the stock market is not doing well or a
rms stock is not doing well, rms will not issue equity. When the economy
is booming, equity issues are large. Empirical work by Choe et al. (1993),
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), and Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggests a
positive relationship between equity issues and the business cycle.
Applying similar ideas on a government level leads to the following. Coun-
tries maybe interested in using more external nancing when their earnings
(GDPs etc.) are high. On the debt side, a country maybe intersted in issuing
debt when interest rates are low and bonds values are high. Recent polit-
ical and economic events illustrate the following. One of the key points of
Trudeaus campaign in the 2015 Canadian election was often mentioning the
fact that Canadas debt/GDP ratio is low compared to other developed coun-
tries and secondly that current interest rates are low and thus the Govern-
ment should use it to borrow and nance investments in infrastructure.14 The
second example is Donald Trumps 2016 US presidential campaign. Speaking
of large government debt, Trump suggested that an increase in interest rates
will reduce the value of debt. which can be used to renegotiate and purhapse
repuchase debt.15 Market timing theory and the bankruptcy costs idea dis-
cussed previously (recognizing that high debt is detrimental to the economy
and the country, i.e. rating agencies reduced the US credit rating based on
an increasing bankruptcy probability) can be relevant to this argument. It is
also related to the exibility theory, which we will discuss later (recognizing
that a very large amount of government debt reduces government exibility in
terms of available choices and that reducing debt (even using non-traditional
[from classical politicians point of view] measures) maybe benetial).
Similarly since asymmetric information should be reduced after an in-
formation release, this should be a good time to conduct equity issues. As
time passes, managers receive new information and the degree of asymme-
try increases. Thus, the magnitude of the price decline associated with a
14http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/what-the-liberals-economic-plan-
would-mean-for-canada/article26838610/
15http://www.npr.org/2016/05/09/477350889/donald-trumps-messy-ideas-for-
handling-the-national-debt-explained
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stock issue announcement should be positively related to the time between
the last information release and the issue. Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald
(1991) nd that equity issues tend to cluster early within a quarter, which
is consistent with the release of quarterly earnings announcements, and that
issues trail o¤ near the end of the quarter. Also, few rms issue equity before
releasing their annual report and larger rms, which su¤er less from asym-
metric information, tend to issue equity later. One interpretation is that
overvalued rms always issue equity. Undervalued rms may wait until the
cost of misvaluation is low enough to be outweighed by the benets from
new projects. Similarly if the arrival of growth opportunities is independent
of price history, then overvalued rms will experience average performance
before the issue. Undervalued rms will have above-average performance as
they wait for the price to improve before they issue equity. Thus, on average,
positive abnormal returns precede equity issues. The evidence conrms this
prediction (Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald, 1990; Loughran and Ritter,
1995). On a government level, countries should use seigniorage when the
currency is overvalued and/or if moneyholders have been enjoying high re-
turns in the near past. Also seigniorage should be conducted closer to GDP
announcmenets, when there is good news about GDP etc.
Ritter and Welch (2002) provide evidence that stock returns of compa-
nies issuing new shares underperform in the long run compared to that of
non-issuing rms. This new issue puzzle suggests that investors purchasing
shares of initial public o¤erings (IPOs) or seasoned equity o¤erings are ir-
rational because they have lower returns compared to investments in shares
of non-issuing rms. Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) and Carter, Dark
and Sapp (2009) note, however, that one needs to estimate the risk of those
rms to provide a correct interpretation of long-term underperformance of
newly issued stocks. Miglo (2007) suggests a rational model explanation.
An analogy on a government level would be that countries using seginorgae
underperform in the long run compared to other countries.
5. Agency-based theories of capital structure. Agency problems that a¤ect
capital structure can arise from either shareholders-manager relationships or
shareholders-creditors relationships. In the former case, shareholders are the
principal and they do not have direct control over the managers actions
(agent). In the latter case creditors (principal) cannot control the actions
of the shareholders (rms owners) responsible for major decisions. Agency
costs arise because managers do not necessarily act in the best interests of the
shareholders who also may not act in the best interests of creditors. There
19
are two major types of conicts between shareholders and creditors: asset
substitution and debt overhang.
5.1. Asset substitution
If an investment yields large returns, equity holders capture most of the
gains. If, however, the investment fails, debt holders bear the consequences.
As a result, equity holders may benet from investing in high risk projects,
even if the projects are value-decreasing. Jensen and Meckling (1976) call
this the asset substitution e¤ect. Debt holders can correctly anticipate
equity holdersfuture behavior. This leads to a decrease in the value of debt
and reduces the incentive to issue debt.
The implication of this idea on a government level means the following.
Suppose that the government has a lot of debt to pay. The governemnt
has no revenue available and therefore the risk that the country will have
to issue a lot of money in order to be able to pay for its debt is very high.
This would lead to high ination, a decrease in the real value of money
etc. In these conditions, the government that predicts that the likelihood
of such a scenario is very high can be engaged in high risk projects. High
risk means that with some small probability the GDP of the country will
be very high and the government will be able to pay back its debt without
causing hyperination etc. Note that on a government level the denition
of a project can have a di¤erent meaning than on a corporate level. It
may include things like wars. If it is the case then one should observe a
positive correlation between the level of debt and the likelihood of initiating
a war. As was mentioned previously, Goldmann (2012) argues, for example,
that excessive sovereign debt leads to a higher risk of unrest and civil war.
Further research is required. If this mechanics takes place indeed then the
implications of it from the optimal nancing point of view is that if a country
has a lot of risky choices (from an investors point of view) then this country
should use less debt. Otherwise countries with high debt would invest in very
risky projects.
5. 2. Debt overhang
The asset substitution problem occurs when rms invest in projects with
negative NPV, while the debt overhang problem occurs when rms do not
invest in projects with positive NPV. Equityholders may underinvest, which
is, pass up protable investments because the rms existing debt captures
most of the projects benets (Myers, 1977). If a rm has issued senior debt,
the equityholders may pass up positive NPV investments. An intuitive ex-
planation of debt overhang problem is provided below. Recall that the NPV
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of a project is sometimes di¤erent for shareholders and creditors. Since the
board of directors usually acts in the interest of the shareholders, a rm will
choose projects with the highest earnings for shareholders. The problem is
that projects with positive NPVs (for the rm as a whole) sometimes have
low payo¤s to the shareholders and junior creditors. In the real world, debt
typically has covenants preventing issues of new debt of the same or higher
seniority as the existing debt. Although one would think that the existing
creditors would be willing to renegotiate these terms since the investment
makes everyone better o¤, it usually does not happen. Financially distressed
rms represent a good practical implication of the debt overhang problem.
It is very di¢ cult for rms to obtain new funds when the rm is in nancial
distress and the exisiting debtholders have a high risk of losing money. These
rms have to cut capital expenditures and R&D. It is also found that rms
that are nancially constrained may have a harder time responding to com-
petition because rms with higher leverage cannot respond to competitors
price changes. This is because any price decrease is in fact an investment
because the rm loses funds in the short term. Evidence of this can been
found in studies in the supermarket and trucking industries. Higher debt
increases the likelihood of debt overhang. Debt overhang may exist in the
form of passing up positive NPV proejcts or paying excessive dividends to
shareholders. The main implication of the debt overhang idea is that rms
with need for exibiltiy should borrow less.
On a government level, a high level of debt may lead to passing up good
investment proejcts. So countries that need exibility the most (for example,
countries with high levels of public investments) should avoid using debt.
Empirical evidence seems to be consistent with this logic. For example, Xu,
Kim and Moussawi (2016) mentioned that rising interest costs would force
reductions in government programs.
Debt overhang has several other implications on a corporate level. The
rm can, for example, ask exisitng (incumbent) creditors for an additional
nancing. Or lenders can commit to additional nancing when the rst loan
is granted. This can also help resolve a debt overhang problem. This idea can
work well for governments because it is harder for them than for corporations
to enforce debt payments. So debt renegotiations are more likely to occur on
a government level.
Note however that the process of debt renegotiations has its own prob-
lems. On the corporate level these negotiations are costly and sometimes not
feasible. The reason for this is because creditors are often dispersed, making
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it hard for all of them to negotiate and creating conicts of interest among
themselves. One other problem that occurs is that creditors have doubts
that their funds will be used for a goodproject. However, if the number
of initial debtholders is large, then the free-rider problem can appear: it is in
the interest of the initial debtholders to put up the money collectively, but it
is not in the interest of any one of them to do it alone because the new debt
has a negative NPV (face value of debt is below the cost of investment). So
the shareholders may nd it hard to convince the creditors to invest in the
new project. The implication of this point on a corporate level is that the
cost of negotiation, the ability of parties invloved to rengotiate, their powers
etc. should a¤ect the outcome of the inital debt agreements. In particular,
if the lenders feel that the borrower has a lot of power and it will be hard
to enforce the debt then the cost of debt should increase. Applying similar
logic on a government level leads to the point that the cost of debt should
be higher for countries with high negotiation power. An example are some
arguments used by president-candidate D. Trump in his 2016 campaign. He
argued that US debt should be renegotiated and it can be done e¢ ciently
and he is the best person for this because he has a lot of experience and
skills in debt rengoatating. Another implication on a governement level is
that in order to facilitate coordination between multiple creditors to the same
country and reduce the risk of the free-rider problem etc, such instituions as
creditors clubs (Paris) have been created to make sure that creditors have
similar opinions.
A special case of the debt overhang problem arises when rms are pri-
marily interested in short-term earnings for shareholders instead of investing
in more protable long-term projects. This may take place when rm has
long-term risky debt and investing in long-term project would create value
for long-term creditors and not for shareholders. Long-term does not nesse-
carily mean long-term in an absolute sense (like any debt with maturity more
than 3 years) but rather with regard to alternative policy decisions available
to the rm. Similarly the shareholders may prefer to invest in a less prof-
itable shorter term project than in a more proftable long-term projects if the
rm has issued long-term debt and investing in long-term projects is more
benecial to creditors. A popular topic for nancial journalists since the
late 1980s has been the perceived short-sightedness of American businesses.
This problem occurs when rms invest in projects that are protable in the
short term compared to the long term, because of the maturity of the high
amounts of debt within the corporation. Applying similar logic on a gov-
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ernment level leads to the point that countries with high debt may prefer
shorter-term investments than is optimal (see, for example, Leeper, Walker
and Yang (2010)).
The following are some of the ways to mitigate the debt overhang prob-
lem. 1. Dividend covenants, which is a restriction where dividends are not
allowed to be paid until the claim is paid to debtholders. These covennats
limit the ability of shreholders to pay high dividends and force them to invest
in positive NPV projects. 2. Banks and privately placed debt can eliminate
the free-rider problem and cheating by shareholders/managers since banks
or private lenders have more incentive and skills to monitor borrowers. In
highly leveraged rms, there is more of an incentive for managers to cheat.
This happened at Enron , and led the company to bankrupcty in 2001. 3.
Debtor-in-possession (DIP) nancing rule in US Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Project nancing creates a direct link between nancing recieved and the
performance of the project where these funds have been invested unlike reg-
ular corporate debt where the probability of paying this debt back depends
also on the rms overall performance. 4. Most commerical mortgages con-
tain covenants that protect the lenders from the kind of behavior associated
with underinvestment in building maintenance. Often it eliminates the incen-
tive to cut maintenance by restricting the payout to the partners (dividend
covenants). 5. Use of short-term debt to mitigate debt overhang if the debt
maturity is before the decisions about new projects are made.
Can one use similar logic on a government level in order to prevent a
debt overhang problem? For example, dividend covenants or other debt
covennats are equivalent to some conditions that are often a part of external
debt contracts, eg no seigniorage condition until debt is paid or requirements
to folllow market reform (asset covenant) etc. Examples represents EBRD
or World bank loans to Eastern european countries in early 1990s.
5.3. Shareholders-manager conict.
Theories of capital structure based on an entrepreneurs moral hazard
problem with regard to her choice of e¤ort, have also suggested explanations
for the link between rm performance and the debt-equity choice. Jensen
and Meckling (1976) underline the idea that an equity issue decreases the
managers stake in the company and reduces the incentive to undertake value
maximizing projects. This results in the after issue underperformance of the
rm. Does this point work for governments? If yes than it means that
printing money can increase the risk of the incumbent government losing
power if the money is accumulated by a few rich people who inuence the
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government etc. This may reduce the incentive for the incument goverment
to work in the interest of the country and not in their own nterest. We do not
know any empirical evidence conrming or rejecting this idea. or excessive
usage of money in an ine¤cient way (similar to high dividends on a corporate
level): politicians spending money on their own priejcts.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) also point out that when a rm can be -
nanced with risk-free debt, the risk-neutral entrepreneur will choose his e¤ort
optimally. Innes (1990) extends the analysis by allowing a large set of possi-
ble contracts and shows that risky debt is still optimal. Jensen (1986) argues
that debt improves the discipline of an entrenched manager. The evidence
conrms that rms use leverage as a disciplinary device for managers. For ex-
ample, rms reduced their leverage after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2004) that
required more reliable nancial information and hence reduced the extent of
agency problems (Bertus, Jahera, and Yost, 2008).
Applying this argument on a government level leads to the following. Gov-
ernments whos countriesperfomances depend strongly on their own perfor-
mances are subject to these kinds of problems. So they should use more debt.
One can consider a situation where a government has to choose between dif-
ferent expenditure possibilities (di¤erent projects) and it has private benets
which do not necessarily correspond with the common optimality of choice
(like a moral hazard at the government level; see also Helsley and Strange
(1998) about private government). For example, some government members
can be interested in nancing some entreprises closer to the areas of their
personal interests etc. Applying the debt and discipline idea to governments
leads to the point that governments that are subject to a higher degree of
moral hazard should benet from a higher level of debt. Governments that
do not have debt are not as e¢ cient as governments that do. Presumably it
works until debt becomes unenforceable. If there is too much debt then the
debt becomes uncotrollable and is unlikely to have the power to be used as
a disciplinary device (similar to debt overhang problem discussed above).
6. Flexibility theory of capital structure. Flexibility theory is related to
the debt overhang idea and it suggests that if a rm has too much debt or
it does not have any credit experience it will be harder for them to obtain
loans when necessary. Firms therefore preserve debt capacity or hold back on
issuing debt because they want to maintain exibility. Firms maintain excess
debt capacity or larger cash balances than are warranted by current needs,
to meet unexpected future requirements. While maintaining this nancing
exibility has value to rms, it also has a cost; the excess debt capacity
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implies that the rm is giving up some value and has a higher cost of capital.
Some predictions of this idea are that other things remaining equal, rms that
operate in businesses where projects earn substantially higher returns than
their hurdle rates should value exibility more than those that operate in
stable businesses where excess returns are small. Also if exibility is viewed
as an option, its value will increase when there is greater uncertainty about
future projects; thus, rms with predictable capital expenditures should value
exibility less. Also the greater the capacity to raise funds, either internally
or externally, the less is the value of exibility. Some implications of this
result are as follows. Firms with signicant internal operating cash ows
should value exibility less than rms with small or negative operating cash
ows. And rms with easy access to nancial markets should have a lower
value for exibility than rms without that access.
Applying similar logic to governments leads to the following. Countries
that have a lot of e¤cient public projects available should borrow less. Coun-
tries with good debt capacity (good rankings for example) can borrow more.
7. Other theories.
7.1. Life cycle theory of capital structure. Life cycle theory of capital
structure argues that besides nancial exibility there are other factors that
can explain nancing patterns of rms in di¤erent stages of their develop-
ment (Damodaran, 2003). Start-up rms do not have much prot, so the tax
advantage of debt is not as important as it is for a mature rm. Start-up
rms do not require incentives for managers since there is no large separation
between ownership and management like in the case of big public corpora-
tions. This leads to the idea that mature rms value debt more compared to
start-up rms. To what extent the life cycle theory represents a separate the-
ory of capital structure rather than a combination of arguments from other
theories remains an open question. Young countries should have lower debt
compared to older countries.
Applying this idea to governments leads to the following. Countries with
good credit ratings and low bankruptcy costs should borrow more. Countries
with bad credit ratings should print more money.
7.2. Theories of capital structure based on corporate culture and history.
Kreps (1990) argues that costly communication inside the rm creates and in-
centive for corporate culture. Hermalin (2001) argues that corporate culture
is an important determinant of corporate governance and corporate nance.
One prediction of this theory is that the capital structure policy of a rm that
has a parent company can be explained by the capital structure policy of the
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parent company because they usually have similar corporate cultures. This
prediction nds some support in Cronqvist, Low and Nilsson (2009). Other
predictions of this theory are that corporate culture can be more important
for capital structure policy in large and/or mature rms.
Applying this idea to governments leads to the following. Countries with
a high degree of risk tolerance borrow more-US etc. Countries with a risk
averse culture (Germany, Japan) borrow less.
Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) argue that a major determinant of
capital structure is debt policy and more specically debt structure prior
to IPO. Firms with low leverage prior to IPO tend to have low leverage
subsequently and vice versa. More theoretical papers addressing the impact
of corporate culture and rm history on capital structure policy are expected.
Applying this idea to governments leads to the following. Countries with
tradtionally low debt should have low debt and vice versa.
7.3. Control-based theories of capital structure. Harris and Raviv (1988),
Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hart (1995) argue that rms issue debt as a
tool to establish an appropriate control structure. Aghion and Bolton (1988)
and Hart (1995) are based on incomplete contracts between rm claimhold-
ers. In an environment where complete contracts are impossible to write, the
question of ownership is crucial because it establishes the residual decision-
maker. Issuing debt establishes an e¢ cient control structure by giving control
to debtholders when a rm is in nancial distress. Literature based on in-
complete contracts has had some success in explaining the life cycle theory
of capital structure (Fluck, 1999). More theoretical papers are still expected.
Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) mention that this literature can also
contribute to the explanation of persistency in observed capital structure
policies.
Applying this idea on a government level leads to the following. Countries
that care about keeping control of the current government or, more genarlly,
keeping the current regime should avoid seigniorage and use more debt in
order to reduce the risk of losing control.
8 Conclusions.
In this article we argue that asymmetric information can explain why seignior-
age is an inferior choice to debt for governments. We also argue that the Ri-
cardian equivalence is very similar to the Modigliani-Miller proposition. Our
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model is based on Bolton et al (2017) in that money for governments has
many similarities with equity for corporations. In contrast to their model,
in our model economic agents are rational. We also provided a discussion
of potential implications of other capital structure theories developped on
a corporate level but applied to government nance. Some empirical evi-
dence seems to suggest that the area of research related to the application
of microeocnomic foundations, and in particular capital structure theory, on
governments is a promising direction for future research.
9 References
Aisen, A. and Veiga, F. (2011). How Does Political Instability A¤ect Eco-
nomic Growth? IMF working paper 2011
Allen F. (1983). Credit Rationing and Payment Incentives, Review of
Economic Studies, 50, 639-646.
Antweiler, W. and Frank, M. (2006). Do US Stock Markets Typically
Overreact to Corporate News Stories?SSRNElectronic Journal DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.878091
Barro R. (1974). Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 82, 6, 1095-1117.
Barro, R. and Gordon, D. (1983a). A positive tlneory of monetary policy
in a natural-rate model, Journal of Political Economy, 91, 589-610.
Barro, R. and Gordon, D. (1983b). Rules, Discretion and Reputation in
a Model of Monetary Policy, Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 101-121.
Berheim B. and Bagwell, K. (1988). Is everything neutral?, Journal of
Political Economy, 96, 2, 308-38.
Bharath, S., Pasquariello, P. andWu, G. (2006). Does Asymmetric Infor-
mation Drive Capital Structure Decisions?EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings; AFA
2008 NewOrleans Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=789725.
Blanchard, O. J. and Fischer, S. (1989). Lectures on macroeconomics,
MIT press.
Bolton, P. and Huang, H. (2018). The Capital Structure of Nations,
Review of Finance, 22, 1, 4582.
Taxation, Government Spending and Economic Growth. 2016. Ed. P.
Booth, Institute of Economic A¤airs.
Brealey, R., Myers, S. and Allen, F. (2013). Principles of Corporate
Finance, McGraw-Hill
27
Burkart, M., Gromb, D., and Panunzi, F. (1997). Large shareholders,
monitoring, and the value of the rm, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112,
693-728.
Burkart, M., Gromb, D., and Panunzi, F. (1998). Why higher takeover
premia protect minority sharholders, Journal of Political Economy, 106, 172-
204.
Choe, H., Masulis, R. and Nanda, V. (1993). Common Stock O¤erings
Across the Business Cycle. Journal of Empirical Finance, 1, 3-31.
Click R. (1998). Seigniorage in a Cross-Selection of Countries, Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 30, 2, 154-171.
Cole H., Dow, J. and English, W. (1995). Default, Settlement and sig-
nalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt,
International Economic Review, 36, 365-385.
Cole H. and Kehoe, P. (1998). Model of Sovereign Debt: Partial versus
General Reputations, International Economic Review, 39, 55-70.
Coleman J. (1986).Political Moneyin Individual Interest and collective
action, Cambridge University Press.
Diamond D. (1989). Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, Journal
of Political Economy 97, 828-862.
DMello, R. and Ferris, S. (2000). The Information E¤ects of Analyst
Activity at the Announcement of New Equity Issues, Financial Management,
29, 1, 78-95.
Ebaid, I. (2009). The impact of capital structure choice on rm perfor-
mance: Empirical evidence from Egypt, The Journal of Risk Finance, 10,
477-487.
Eaton J. and Gersovitz, M. (1981). Debt with Potential Repudiation:
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, Review of Economic Studies 48, 289-
309.
Elbahnasawy, N. and Ellis, M. (2016). Economic Structure and Seignor-
age: a Dynamic Panel data Analysis, Economic Inquiry, 54, 2, 940-965
Fama E. and French, K. (2001). Disappearing dividends:changing rm
characteristics or lower propensity to pay?, Journal of Financial Economics,
60, 3-43.
Finnerty, J.D. (2013). Project nancing: Asset-based Financial Engineer-
ing. John Wiley & Sons.
Frank, M. and Goyal, V. (2003). Testing the pecking order theory of
capital structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 67, 2, 217-248
28
Green, R. (1984). Investment incentives, debt and warrants. Journal of
Financial Economics, 13, 115-136.
Grossman, S. and Hart, O. (1980). Takeover bids, the free-rider problem
and the theory of the corporation, Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 42-64.
Hart O. (1995). Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Clarendon
press.
Kalay, A. and Zender, J. (1997). Bankruptcy, Warrants, and State-
Contingent Changes in the Ownership of Control, Journal of Financial In-
termediation, 6, 4, 347-379
Haslag, J. (1998). Seigniorage revenue and monetary policy: some pre-
liminary evidence, Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, Q III, 10-20.
Leeper, E., Walker, T. and Yang, S. (2010). Government investment and
scal stimulus, Journal of Monetary Economics, 57, 8, 1000-1012.
Masulis, R. and Korwar, A. (1986). Seasoned equity o¤erings: An em-
pirical investigation. Journal of Financial Economics, 15, 1-2, 91-118.
Miglo, A. (2007). Debt-equity choice as a signal of earnings prole over
time, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 47, 1, 69-93.
Miglo, A., (2011). Trade-O¤, Pecking Order, Signaling, and Market Tim-
ing Models, in H. K. Baker, G. S. Martin Capital Structure and Corporate
Financing Decisions: Theory, Evidence, and Practice, Wiley and Sons, Ch.
10, 171-191.
Miglo, A. (2012). Multi-Stage Investment, Long-TermAsymmetric Infor-
mation and Pecking Order Revisited, Journal of Current Issues in Finance,
Business, and Economics, 4, 4, 43-59.
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance and the Theory of Investment. American Economic Review 48, 3,
261297.
Myers, S.C. and Majluf, N. (1984). Corporate nancing and investment
decisions when rms have information that investors do not have, Journal
of Financial Economics, 13, 187-222.
Noe, T. and Nachman, D. (1994). Optimal Design of Securites under
Asymmectric Information. Review of Financial Studies 7, 1-44.
Obstfeld, M. (1997). Dynamic Seignorage Theory: an Exploration,
Macroeconomic Dynamics, 1, 588614.
Poterba J. and Rotemberg, J. (1990). Ination and Taxation with Opti-
mizing Governments, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 22, 1, 1-18.
29
Sargent T. (1987). Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory. Harvard University
Press.
Shkolnyk, I. and Koilo, V. (2018). The relationship between exter-
nal debt and economic growth: empirical evidence from Ukraine and other
emerging economies. Investment Management and Financial Innovations,
15, 1, 387-400.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1994). Politicians and Firms, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 109, 4, 995-1025.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1997). A survey of corporate governance,
Journal of Finance, 52, 737-789.
Titman, S., and Wessels, R. (1988). The Determinants of Capital Struc-
ture Choice, Journal of Finance, 43, 1-21.
Wallace N. (1981). A Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Open-Market Op-
erations, Amercican Economic Review, 71, 267-274.
Wedig G., Hassan, M. and Morrisey, M. (1996). Tax-Exempt Debt and
the Capital Structure of Nonprot Organisations: An Application to Hospi-
tals, The Journal of Finance, LI, 4, 1247-1283.
Wolla, S. (2013). GDP: Does It Measure Up?, PAGE ONE Economics
Newsletter, Federal Bank of St-Louis.
30
